I MYSELF never spoke to any of the great stock manipulators that the Street still talks about．I don't mean leaders；I mean manipulators．They were all before my time，although when I first came to New York，James R．Keene，greatest of them all，was in his prime．But I was a mere youngster then，exclusively concerned with duplicating，in a reputable broker's office，the success I had enjoyed in the bucket shops of my native city．And，then，too，at the time Keene was busy with the U．S．Steel stocks—his manipulative masterpiece—I had no experience with manipulation，no real knowledge of it or of its value or meaning，and，for that matter，no great need of such knowledge．If I thought about it at all I suppose I must have regarded it as a well-dressed form of thimble-rigging，of which the lowbrow form was such tricks as had been tried on me in the bucket shops．Such talk as I since have heard on the subject has consisted in great part of surmises and suspicions；of guesses rather than intelligent analyses．

More than one man who knew him well has told me that Keene was the boldest and most brilliant operator that ever worked in Wall Street．That is saying a great deal，for there have been some great traders．Their names are now all but forgotten，but nevertheless they were kings in their day—for a day！They were pulled up out of obscurity into the sunlight of financial fame by the ticker tape—and the little paper ribbon didn't prove strong enough to keep them suspended there long enough for them to become historical fixtures．At all events Keene was by all odds the best manipulator of his day—and it was a long and exciting day．

He capitalized his knowledge of the game，his experience as an operator and his talents when he sold his services to the Havemeyer brothers，who wanted him to develop a market for the Sugar stocks．He was broke at the time or he would have continued to trade on his own hook；and he was some plunger！He was successful with Sugar；made the shares trading favourites，and that made them easily vendible．After that，he was asked time and again to take charge of pools．I am told that in these pool operations he never asked or accepted a fee，but paid for his share like the other members of the pool．The market conduct of the stock，of course，was exclusively in his charge．Often there was talk of treachery—on both sides．His feud with the Whitney-Ryan clique arose from such accusations．It is not difficult for a manipulator to be misunderstood by his associates．They don't see his needs as he himself does．I know this from my own experience．

It is a matter of regret that Keene did not leave an accurate record of his greatest exploit—the successful manipulation of the U．S．Steel shares in the spring of 1901．As I understand it，Keene never had an interview with J．P．Morgan about it．Morgan's firm dealt with or through Talbot J．Taylor & Co.，at whose office Keene made his headquarters．Talbot Taylor was Keene's son-in-law．I am assured that Keene's fee for his Work consisted of the pleasure he derived from the work．That he made millions trading in the market he helped to put up that spring is well known．He told a friend of mine that in the course of a few weeks he sold in the open market for the underwriters' syndicate more than seven hundred and fifty thousand shares．Not bad when you consider two things：That they were new and untried stocks of a corporation whose capitalization was greater than the entire debt of the United States at that time；and second，that men like D．G．Reid，W．B．Leeds，the Moore brothers，Henry Phipps，H．C．Frick and the other Steel magnates also sold hundreds of thousands of shares to the public at the same time in the same market that Keene helped to create．

Of course，general conditions favoured him．Not only actual business but sentiment and his unlimited financial backing made possible his success．What we had was not merely a big bull market but a boom and a state of mind not likely to be seen again．The undigested-securities panic came later，when Steel common，which Keene had marked up to 55 in 1901，sold at 10 in 1903 and at 8 in 1904．

We can't analyse Keene's manipulative campaigns．His books are not available；the adequately detailed record is nonexistent．For example，it would be interesting to see how he worked in Amalgamated Copper．H．H．Rogers and William Rockefeller had tried to dispose of their surplus stock in the market and had failed．Finally they asked Keene to market their line，and he agreed．Bear in mind that H．H．Rogers was one of the ablest business men of his day in Wall Street and that William Rockefeller was the boldest speculator of the entire Standard Oil coterie．They had practically unlimited resources and vast prestige as well as years of experience in the stock-market game．And yet they had to go to Keene．I mention this to show you that there are some tasks which it requires a specialist to perform．Here was a widely touted stock，sponsored by America's greatest capitalists，that could not be sold except at a great sacrifice of money and prestige．Rogers and Rockefeller were intelligent enough to decide that Keene alone might help them．

Keene began to work at once．He had a bull market to work in and sold two hundred and twenty thousand shares of Amalgamated at around par．After he disposed of the insiders' line the public kept on buying and the price went ten points higher．Indeed the insiders got bullish on the stock they had sold when they saw how eagerly the public was taking it．There was a story that Rogers actually advised Keene to go long of Amalgamated．It is scarcely credible that Rogers meant to unload on Keene．He was too shrewd a man not to know that Keene was no bleating lamb．Keene worked as he always did—that is，doing his big selling on the way down after the big rise．Of course his tactical moves were directed by his needs and by the minor currents that changed from day to day．In the stock market，as in warfare，it is well to keep in mind the difference between strategy and tactics．

One of Keene's confidential men—he is the best fly fisherman I know—told me only the other day that during the Amalgamated campaign Keene would find himself almost out of stock one day—that is，out of the stock he had been forced to take in marking up the price；and on the next day he would buy back thousands of shares．On the day after that，he would sell on balance．Then he would leave the market absolutely alone，to see how it would take care of itself and also to accustom it to do so．When it came to the actual marketing of the line he did what I told you：he sold it on the way down．The trading public is always looking for a rally，and，besides，there is the covering by the shorts．

The man who was closest to Keene during that deal told me that after Keene sold the Rogers-Rockefeller line for something like twenty or twenty-five million dollars in cash Rogers sent him a check for two hundred thousand．This reminds you of the millionaire's wife who gave the Metropolitan Opera House scrub-woman fifty cents reward for finding the one-hundred-thousand-dollar pearl necklace．Keene sent the check back with a polite note saying he was not a stock broker and that he was glad to have been of some service to them．They kept the check and wrote him that they would be glad to work with him again．Shortly after that it was that H．H．Rogers gave Keene the friendly tip to buy Amalgamated at around 130！

A brilliant operator，James R．Keene！His private secretary told me that when the market was going his way Mr．Keene was irascible；and those who knew him say his irascibility was expressed in sardonic phrases that lingered long in the memory of his hearers．But when he was losing he was in the best of humour，a polished man of the world，agreeable，epigrammatic，interesting．

He had in superlative degree the qualities of mind that are associated with successful speculators anywhere．That he did not argue with the tape is plain．He was utterly fearless but never reckless．He could and did turn in a twinkling，if he found he was wrong．

Since his day there have been so many changes in Stock Exchange rules and so much more rigorous enforcement of old rules，so many new taxes on stock sales and profits，and so on，that the game seems different．Devices that Keene could use with skill and profit can no longer be utilised．Also，we are assured，the business morality of Wall Street is on a higher plane．Nevertheless it is fair to say that in any period of our financial history Keene would have been a great manipulator because he was a great stock operator and knew the game of speculation from the ground up．He achieved what he did because conditions at the time permitted him to do so．He would have been as successful in his undertakings in 1922 as he was in 1901 or in 1876，when he first came to New York from California and made nine million dollars in two years．There are men whose gait is far quicker than the mob's．They are bound to lead—no matter how much the mob changes．

As a matter of fact，the change is by no means as radical as you'd imagine．The rewards are not so great，for it is no longer pioneer work and therefore it is not pioneer's pay．But in certain respects manipulation is easier than it was；in other ways much harder than in Keene's day．

There is no question that advertising is an art，and manipulation is the art of advertising through the medium of the tape．The tape should tell the story the manipulator wishes its readers to see．The truer the story the more convincing it is bound to be，and the more convincing it is the better the advertising is．A manipulator today，for instance，has not only to make a stock look strong but also to make it be strong．Manipulation therefore must be based on sound trading principles．That is what made Keene such a marvellous manipulator；he was a consummate trader to begin with．

The word“manipulation”has come to have an ugly sound．It needs an alias．I do not think there is anything so very mysterious or crooked about the process itself when it has for an object the selling of a stock in bulk，provided，of course，that such operations are not accompanied by misrepresentation．There is little question that a manipulator necessarily seeks his buyers among speculators．He turns to men who are looking for big returns on their capital and are therefore willing to run a greater than normal business risk．I can't have much sympathy for the man who，knowing this，nevertheless blames others for his own failure to make easy money．He is a devil of a clever fellow when he wins．But when he loses money the other fellow was a crook；a manipulator！In such moments and from such lips the word connotes the use of marked cards．But this is not so．

Usually the object of manipulation is to develop marketability—that is，the ability to dispose of fair-sized blocks at some price at any time．Of course a pool，by reason of a reversal of general market conditions，may find itself unable to sell except at a sacrifice too great to be pleasing．They then may decide to employ a professional，believing that his skill and experience will enable him to conduct an orderly retreat instead of suffering an appalling rout．

You will notice that I do not speak of manipulation designed to permit considerable accumulation of a stock as cheaply as possible，as，for instance，in buying for control，because this does not happen often nowadays．

When Jay Gould wished to cinch his control of Western Union and decided to buy a big block of the stock，Washington E．Connor，who had not been seen on the floor of the Stock Exchange for years，suddenly showed up in person at the Western Union post．He began to bid for Western Union．The traders to a man laughed—at his stupidity in thinking them so simple—and they cheerfully sold him all the stock he wanted to buy．It was too raw a trick，to think he could put up the price by acting as though Mr．Gould wanted to buy Western Union．Was that manipulation？I think I can only answer that by saying“No；and yes！”

In the majority of cases the object of manipulation is，as I said，to sell stock to the public at the best possible price．It is not alone a question of selling but of distributing．It is obviously better in every way for a stock to be held by a thousand people than by one man—better for the market in it．So it is not alone the sale at a good price but the character of the distribution that a manipulator must consider．

There is no sense in marking up the price to a very high level if you cannot induce the public to take it off your hands later．Whenever inexperienced manipulators try to unload at the top and fail，old-timers look mighty wise and tell you that you can lead a horse to water but you cannot make him drink．Original devils！As a matter of fact，it is well to remember a rule of manipulation，a rule that Keene and his able predecessors well knew．It is this：Stocks are manipulated to the highest point possible and then sold to the public on the way down．

Let me begin at the beginning．Assume that there is some one—an underwriting syndicate or a pool or an individual—that has a block of stock which it is desired to sell at the best price possible．It is a stock duly listed on the New York Stock Exchange．The best place for selling it ought to be the open market，and the best buyer ought to be the general public．The negotiations for the sale are in charge of a man．He—or some present or former associate—has tried to sell the stock on the Stock Exchange and has not succeeded．He is—or soon becomes—sufficiently familiar with stock-market operations to realize that more experience and greater aptitude for the work are needed than he possesses．He knows personally or by hearsay several men who have been successful in their handling of similar deals，and he decides to avail himself of their professional skill．He seeks one of them as he would seek a physician if he were ill or an engineer if he needed that kind of expert．

Suppose he has heard of me as a man who knows the game．Well，I take it that he tries to find out all he can about me．He then arranges for an interview，and in due time calls at my office．

Of course，the chances are that I know about the stock and what it represents．It is my business to know．That is how I make my living．My visitor tells me what he and his associates wish to do，and asks me to undertake the deal．

It is then my turn to talk．I ask for whatever information I deem necessary to give me a clear understanding of what I am asked to undertake．I determine the value and estimate the market possibilities of that stock．That and my reading of current conditions in turn help me to gauge the likelihood of success for the proposed operation．

If my information inclines me to a favourable view I accept the proposition and tell him then and there what my terms will be for my services．If he in turn accepts my terms—the honorarium and the conditions—I begin my work at once．

I generally ask and receive calls on a block of stock．I insist upon graduated calls as the fairest to all concerned．The price of the call begins at a little below the prevailing market price and goes up；say，for example，that I get calls on one hundred thousand shares and the stock is quoted at 40．I begin with a call for some thousands of shares at 35，another at 37，another at 40，and at 45 and 50，and so on up to 75 or 80．

If as the result of my professional work—my manipulation—the price goes up，and if at the highest level there is a good demand for the stock so that I can sell fair-sized blocks of it I of course call the stock．I am making money；but so are my clients making money．This is as it should be．If my skill is what they are paying for they ought to get value．Of course，there are times when a pool may be wound up at a loss，but that is seldom，for I do not undertake the work unless I see my way clear to a profit．This year I was not so fortunate in one or two deals，and I did not make a profit．There are reasons，but that is another story，to be told later—perhaps．

The first step in a bull movement in a stock is to advertise the fact that there is a bull movement on．Sounds silly，doesn't it？Well，think a moment．It isn't as silly as it sounded，is it？The most effective way to advertise what，in effect，are your honourable intentions is to make the stock active and strong．After all is said and done，the greatest publicity agent in the wide world is the ticker，and by far the best advertising medium is the tape．I do not need to put out any literature for my clients．I do not have to inform the daily press as to the value of the stock or to work the financial reviews for notices about the company's prospects．Neither do I have to get a following．I accomplish all these highly desirable things by merely making the stock active．When there is activity there is a synchronous demand for explanations；and that means，of course，that the necessary reasons—for publication—supply themselves without the slightest aid from me．

Activity is all that the floor traders ask．They will buy or sell any stock at any level if only there is a free market for it．They will deal in thousands of shares wherever they see activity，and their aggregate capacity is considerable．It necessarily happen that they constitute the manipulator's first crop of buyers．They will follow you all the way up and they thus are a great help at all the stages of the operation．I understand that James R．Keene used habitually to employ the most active of the room traders，both to conceal the source of the manipulation and also because he knew that they were by far the best business-spreaders and tip-distributors．He often gave calls to them—verbal calls—above the market，so that they might do some helpful work before they could cash in．He made them earn their profit．To get a professional following I myself have never had to do more than to make a stock active．Traders don't ask for more．It is well，of course，to remember that these professionals on the floor of the Exchange buy stocks with the intention of selling them at a profit．They do not insist on its being a big profit；but it must be a quick profit．

I make the stock active in order to draw the attention of speculators to it，for the reasons I have given．I buy it and I sell it and the traders follow suit．The selling pressure is not apt to be strong where a man has as much speculatively held stock sewed up—in calls—as I insist on having．The buying，therefore，prevails over the selling，and the public follows the lead not so much of the manipulator as of the room traders．It comes in as a buyer．This highly desirable demand I fill—that is，I sell stock on balance．If the demand is what it ought to be it will absorb more than the amount of stock I was compelled to accumulate in the earlier stages of the manipulation；and when this happens I sell the stock short—that is，technically．In other words，I sell more stock than I actually hold．It is perfectly safe for me to do so since I am really selling against my calls．Of course，when the demand from the public slackens，the stock ceases to advance．Then I wait．

Say，then，that the stock has ceased to advance．There comes a weak day．The entire market may develop a reactionary tendency or some sharp-eyed trader my perceive that there are no buying orders to speak of in my stock，and he sells it，and his fellows follow．Whatever the reason may be，my stock starts to go down．Well，I begin to buy it．I give it the support that a stock ought to have if it is in good odour with its own sponsors．And more：I am able to support it without accumulating it—that is，without increasing the amount I shall have to sell later on．Observe that I do this without decreasing my financial resources．Of course what I am really doing is covering stock I sold short at higher prices when the demand from the public or from the traders or from both enabled me to do it．It is always well to make it plain to the traders—and to the public，also—that there is a demand for the stock on the way down．That tends to check both reckless short selling by the professionals and liquidation by frightened holders—which is the selling you usually see when a stock gets weaker and weaker，which in turn is what a stock does when it is not supported．These covering purchases of mine constitute what I call the stabilising process．

As the market broadens I of course sell stock on the way up，but never enough to check the rise．This is in strict accordance with my stabilising plans．It is obvious that the more stock I sell on a reasonable and orderly advance the more I encourage the conservative speculators，who are more numerous than the reckless room traders；and in addition the more support I shall be able to give to the stock on the inevitable weak days．By always being short I always am in a position to support the stock without danger to myself．As a rule I begin my selling at a price that will show me a profit．But I often sell without having a profit，simply to create or to increase what I may call my riskless buying power．My business is not alone to put up the price or to sell a big block of stock for a client but to make money for myself．That is why I do not ask any clients to finance my operations．My fee is contingent upon my success．

Of course what I have described is not my invariable practice．I neither have nor adhere to an inflexible system．I modify my terms and conditions according to circumstances．

A stock which it is desired to distribute should be manipulated to the highest possible point and then sold．I repeat this both because it is fundamental and because the public apparently believes that the selling is all done at the top．Sometimes a stock gets waterlogged，as it were；it doesn't go up．That is the time to sell．The price naturally will go down on your selling rather further than you wish，but you can generally nurse it back．As long as a stock that I am manipulating goes up on my buying I know I am all hunky，and if need be I buy it with confidence and use my own money without fear—precisely as I would any other stock that acts the same way．It is the line of least resistance．You remember my trading theories about that line，don't you？Well，when the price line of least resistance is established I follow it，not because I am manipulating that particular stock at that particular moment but because I am a stock operator at all times．

When my buying does not put the stock up I stop buying and then proceed to sell it down；and that also is exactly what I would do with that same stock if I did not happen to be manipulating it．The principal marketing of the stock，as you know，is done on the way down．It is perfectly astonishing how much stock a man can get rid of on a decline．

I repeat that at no time during the manipulation do I forget to be a stock trader．My problems as a manipulator，after all，are the same that confront me as an operator．All manipulation comes to an end when the manipulator cannot make a stock do what he wants it to do．When the stock you are manipulating doesn't act as it should，quit．Don't argue with the tape．Do not seek to lure the profit back．Quit while the quitting is good—and cheap．

我从来没跟现在还被华尔街津津乐道的那些股市高手说过话，我指的不是领袖，而是大作手。他们都是我炒股的这个时代之前的人。不过，我初次到达纽约时，所有作手中最伟大的人詹姆斯·凯恩正春风得意。可那时我只是个年轻人，只关心怎么样在一家靠谱的股票公司，做出当年在对赌行那样的成就来。而且，凯恩当时正忙于炒作美国钢铁公司的股票，这属于他的炒股杰作。我那时候还没有炒作经验，也没有真正了解炒作的价值与意义，而且对炒作的知识也没什么需求。如果我那时能想到炒作，那也是因为我把炒作看作一种高级的欺骗手段。对赌行用在我身上的那些手段都是低级的骗术。自那时起，我听到的有关炒作的话，都是推测或者质疑，猜的成分要高于理性分析的成分。

与凯恩很熟悉的人对我说过很多次，凯恩是华尔街上自古以来最精明、最有魄力的作手。这一点的意义很重大，因为厉害角色很多，如今都被人们所遗忘，他们叱咤江湖的时候，都是国王一般的显赫，在某一天都是国王。他们依靠报价牌，从毫不知名逐渐成长于金融界，最后创造了名气。可那小小的彩色报价纸牌没有多大的吸引力，不能让他们在那里驻扎多长时间，很难留名后世。反正，凯恩确实成了那代人中最出色的作手，有过很长一段色彩斑斓的岁月。

凯恩运用着他掌握的炒股知识、经验和才干，在哈维梅尔兄弟手下做事。哈维梅尔兄弟想让他为美国糖业公司的股票打造一片市场。当时他不名一文，不然肯定会继续自力更生地操作，他是个非常了不起的大赌徒。在美国糖业公司的股票上，他做得非常成功，他让这只股票成了最受欢迎、最活跃的一只。事情过后，他总被各个公司内部请去操盘。有人对我说，他在这些公司内部炒作时，不会索要或者接收费用，而是总要与公司其他成员那样，得到一份该有的分成。他全权负责股票在市场上的情势，双方总会产生各种叛离和偷跑的传言，他与惠特尼·莱恩集团的争斗，就因为受到了这样的传言攻击。作手想被同伴误解其实很容易，那些同伴不会像他一样，知道自己所需为何。我明白这点是源于自己的经验。

让人惋惜的是，凯恩1901年春完成的最伟大的杰作，即炒作美国钢铁公司的股票，没有确切的记录留给后世。以我的了解，凯恩与摩根先生一直没聊过这事。摩根公司通过塔波特泰勒公司交易，而这家公司则是凯恩的老巢。塔波特泰勒是凯恩的女婿。我敢肯定，凯恩对这家公司的付出，是包括了通过努力获得乐趣的。那年春天，他炒热了市场，也通过交易赚了几百万美元。谁都知道这件事。他对我的一个朋友说过，只短短几周的时间，他通过公开市场，为股票承销公司至少卖出了75万股。如果你了解了下面这两件事情，就会明白这是很厉害的成绩。首先，这是一只没有在市场中历练过的新股票，公司的总资本大过了美国当时的国债总额。其次，也是那个时候，凯恩帮忙打造的另一个市场中，雷德、利兹、穆尔兄弟、亨利·菲利普、弗里克及其他钢铁业的大腕们，也向大众卖掉了几十万股票。

当然，市场走向有利于他，不光当时经济状况是这样，人气和没有受限的资金支援也是他成功的因素。那时候的市场非常好，是一个很大的多头，那样的盛况再出现的概率很小。后来才发生了让人受不了的股市大恐慌。1901年，凯恩炒作抬高的美国钢铁公司普通股是每股55美元，到了1903年股市恐慌的时候，暴跌到了10美元，1904年更是到了8又7/8美元。

我无法具体分析凯恩的所作所为，因为他没写过书，一点儿详细记录都没留下。比如，知道他在联合铜矿公司是怎么样炒作的，肯定会非常精彩。罗杰斯和洛克菲勒曾试图把手中的股票抛出去，结果却遭遇了失败，只好求助凯恩帮忙。凯恩答应了他们的请求。请记住，在罗杰斯的那个时代，他自己本身就是华尔街上一位特别厉害的企业家，洛克菲勒更是标准石油公司里最勇敢的投机人。其实，他们手中拥有的资源非常强大，还有很好的个人名声和很多年驰骋股市的老到经验，但却需要凯恩帮忙。我说这个故事是要告诉你，有的事还非得请专家做才行。这是一只由美国最厉害的几个资本家支撑的备受青睐的股票，却没有很好的卖出市场，如果想要卖出去，就得牺牲很多资金和名声。罗杰斯与洛克菲勒聪明过人，所以觉得只有凯恩才能帮上他们的忙。

凯恩立马投入到了工作当中，他要应对多头市场，按照票面价格卖出22万股联合铜矿的股票。卖掉公司内部的股票后，大众还在继续买，价格也上升了10个点。公司看到股民们这么热衷于这只股票的时候，居然变成了看好卖出的股票。有传言说，罗杰斯还真的向凯恩提出建议，要做多。如果说是罗杰斯想把股票倒给凯恩，那可信度就不高。罗杰斯那么聪明，肯定不会把凯恩当冤大头对待。凯恩按照以往做法，在涨势好的时候，一直压低卖出。当然，他这么做是因为有这样的需求，有受到股市每天的小波动影响。在股市里，跟在战场上一样，要牢牢记住大的谋划和具体的做法之间是有区别的。

有个特别会空手套白狼的人，也是凯恩最信任的人，他前几天对我说，在联合铜矿的那次交易中，如果凯恩有一天发现，自己手中没有一点儿之前为了抬高股价而不得不买回来的股票，第二天他就会买进几千甚至几万股，再过一天，他可能又会卖掉。接着，他不再去理会市场，只让市场自生自灭，同时也给市场一个适应这种状况的机会。他真想彻底卖出手中的股票时，就会像我对你说的那样，一路压低抛售。普通股民们都希望股市会反弹，而且空头也会回补。关于这场炒作，一位和凯恩非常熟悉的人对我提到过，说凯恩帮助罗杰斯和洛克菲勒卖了股票，让他们得到了大概2000万或者2500万现金，罗杰斯送给凯恩一张20万美元的支票。这让人联想到一个百万富翁的妻子，拿出5美分答谢纽约大都会歌剧院的女清洁工，因为女清洁工帮她找到了一串价值10万美元的珍珠项链。凯恩退回了支票，并且顺带递去一张纸条，说自己又不是交易所的营业员，非常高兴能帮上这个小忙。罗杰斯接下了支票，写信说，非常期待能够再次合作。没多久，好心的罗杰斯向凯恩传递了内幕消息，让他在联合铜矿股价到130美元的时候买进。

真是个天才作手啊！好厉害的詹姆斯·凯恩！他的秘书对我说，市场的走向跟他的预期一样时，他会很容易发脾气。知道他的人说，他总是用冷嘲热讽的口气来说话，让人难忘，可以从中看出他的暴躁来。他脾气好的时候是赔了钱后，那时他总表现得像很有教养的上流社会的人，非常和蔼可亲，说话风趣幽默，妙语连珠。

他身上具备了一个成功的炒股专家所必需的那种优良品性，他不论在哪儿炒股都会很成功。很明显，他从不做违逆股市大盘的事情，也从不莽撞行事，他一旦知道自己做错了，会立马摆脱错误轨道。

从他那时候到现在，证券交易的法律法规变化太多，比旧法规也严格了很多，在交易和利润上增加了不少赋税，等等。所以，这个游戏貌似已经发生了变化，凯恩的那些赚钱妙招现在已经过时了。而且，有人对我们很肯定地说，华尔街现在的商业道德已经提高了很多。不过，我可以客观地说，在美国金融发展史上，不管哪个时代，凯恩都会成为一个伟大的作手，因为他是个伟大的炒股手，对投机游戏了解得非常全面透彻。他之所以取得了这样的成果，是因为当时的情况容许他这样做。如果他能在1922年的时候玩股票，一定会取得与1901年时同样的成就，也会跟1876年他初从加州到纽约那样获得成功，那时候他两年就赚了900万美元。有一类人的脚步就是比普通人要快得多，不管跟怎样的普通大众在一个时代，他们天生就是领袖级人物。

其实时代的变化并没有你所想的那么厉害。能够获得的利润确实大不如前，现在已经不是开疆扩土的时代了，也就没有了那些金融前锋获得过的那种利润。可在有些方面，却更适宜炒作了，此外的其他方面都比凯恩那时候难多了。

广告是一门艺术，这是毫无疑问的。把股市大盘当作媒介一样用来炒作，这也是广告艺术。股市行情所呈现的应该是作手们希望大家想看到的情况。故事的真实度越高，说服力也越强，同时广告效果也越好。如今的作手们不但需要让某只股票看起来很有力，而且也要真的让它变得有力。所以，炒作的前提必须是要有健全的交易规则。这是凯恩能成为股市圣手的原因，他自始至终都是最合格的交易者。

“炒作”一词已经成了贬义，它需要被一个其他名称代替。我觉得，假若炒作是为了卖出大把股票的话，那么炒作的过程并没多神妙，也没什么问题。当然，前提是炒作过程中不能混入误导别人的因素。作手们必须要在股民中间寻找买股票的人，这是铁定的。这些买主期望着能赚到大量利润，所以也情愿承担比正常商业风险更大的风险。我不同情那些明明知道这个道理却说自己不能赚到轻松钱是因为别人的原因的人。这样的人在赚钱时好像很聪明，但只要赔了钱就会把别人当坏人和作手。这个时候，炒作从他们的嘴里说出来，就添加了别人在偷偷作弊的暗示，而真实的情形其实不是这样。

一般来说，炒作是为了拓展出市场，也就是说能在任何时候都按照某个价位卖掉手中一大把的股票。有些公司内部如果发现手中的股票因为市场逆转而没办法卖掉，会因此受到很大的损失，他们就会做出雇专家帮忙的决定，他们认为专家的水平和经验有助于他们按照一定的秩序从股市缓缓抽身，而不至于受到很大的损失。

你会发现，我没有说到那些尽力按照最低价买大量股票为目的的炒作，比如以买股票为手段而实现控制股票的行为，因为这样的事情如今已经不常出现了。

古德想着要真正控制西联电报公司，就决定大量买入这只股票，而此时已经好久没有在交易大厅露过面的华盛顿·康纳却忽然出现在了交易所的西联电报股票交易点。他开始买进股票了，大厅里的人们都嘲笑他怎么如此愚蠢地觉得他们很单纯呢，所以都非常得意地把所有的西联电报股票卖给他。他们觉得这是低级的手段，认为康纳在假装古德想让他买进，然后可以拉高股价了。这是炒作？我觉得我可以这样回答：“是，但又不是。”

正如我所说，大多数情况下，炒作是为了按照最高的价格把手中所持股票卖给股民，这不光是个卖出的问题，而且也是分散抛售。不管怎么看，一只股票在1000个人手中，比在一个人手中要好很多，这样有利于市场。所以，作手们需要考虑的不仅是以高价卖出股票，也要考虑股票分散情况。

如果你后续不能诱使股民们从你手中买走股票，那拉抬股价到一个高价位，就没任何道理。当经验不足的作手们准备在头部卖出股票遭遇失败的时候，老手们就会好像很聪明地对你说：“你牵匹马到水边容易，但强迫它喝水就难了。”这人真是好有创意啊。其实，你必须记住炒作的一条规则，这是一条凯恩和其他厉害的老前辈们都很熟悉的规则，那就是要尽力把股票价格炒作到很高的价位，然后再一路压低，分抛给普通的股民。

我还是从头说起吧。假设一个人、一个股票承销商或者一家公司有一大把股票，想按照高价抛出，它在纽交所正常挂牌。股票买卖最理想的地方应该就是公开市场，而最好的购买者应该是普通股民。和卖股票有关的谈判应该由一个人负责，他是公司在位的或者已经退位的董事，他准备在交易所卖出这只股票，但是却没有成功。他已经非常熟悉或者很快就熟悉股市流程了，他清楚必须要有一个经验更丰富、更有水平的人来操作。他听到过或者本来就知道有很多符合标准的人，他打算运用专业手段来操作。他寻找其中一个人，就像生病了去看医生，或者需要工程技术时去找工程师一样。

假设他听说我非常擅长股票交易，那我觉得他就会想方设法地查找与我有关的资料看，接着见我，如果时间合适，他还会到我办公室登门拜访。

我可能对这只股票恰好很了解，知道它的价值所在。对这些很了解本来就是我的分内之事，也是我谋生的手段。来人会对我讲他与他的朋友的需求，进而提出与我合作的希望。

轮到我发言了，我让对方把我觉得必要的能让我知晓这次操作的资料交给我。我判断一下这只股票价格，对它在市场交易中的可能性进行评估，然后结合我对当时股市行情的判断，预估这次操作会不会成功。

我如果通过所有的信息资料得出了令人满意的结果，那我就会答应合作，当时就告诉他我的条件。假如他接受了我提出的条件，包括我需要的酬金，我就可以立即展开操作了。

一般情况下，我需要得到并且也能得到一大笔股票认购权。我绝对需要的是累进认购权，这样对谁都很公平。认购权股价一开始比市场价低一点儿，然后慢慢升高。比如，我获得了10万股的认购权，它的股价目前是40美元，我就一开始用35美元认购几千股，接着是37美元、40美元、45美元、50美元，逐步升高，直到75美元或者80美元。

如果经过我的努力和炒作后，股价上涨了，而且到了最高的价位，人们都很热心购买它，我就可以卖掉一大部分了，我肯定要执行我的认购权。我获得了利润，我的客户也一样赚了钱，这就是理当出现的结果。我拥有的技术如果真是他们用钱所寻找的对象，那他们自然就能获得价值。不过，有时候对方最终也有可能赔钱，不过这样的情况很少，因为我在接这份工作的时候就评估过自己能获得的利润了，不然也不会接手。今年，我接手的那么一两个任务运气不好，没有赚到钱。原因也很多，不过这是另外一回事了，以后有机会我可能会讲。

一只股票要想实现多头走势，首先要做宣传，让人相信正有一个多头走势在伺机而动。是不是听起来很有意思？你再看看，实际上也没那么搞笑，不是吗？其实最有效的宣传，就是你真心实意地去让这只股票活跃起来，变得力道很大。说完该说的，做完该做的以后，全世界最好的公关人员就是股价机器，股市大盘走向就是最好的宣传媒介。我没必要去为客户做任何宣传，不必通过报纸报道股价，不必让财经报道发表对公司未来有多看好，更不需要有粉丝跟在屁股后面。我只需要把这只股票玩得活跃起来，就可以实现我特别想要的结果。股票交易很活跃的时候，就自然会有人想知道原因，当然这一点也说明，那些必要的原因会自己冒出来，出现在媒体上，一点儿都不需要我去协助。

场内股民们需要的只是交易活泛的股票。只要存在自由市场，他们会在任何价位交易股票，看到活跃的交易就会买卖成千上万股，这些分散力量集合起来就很强大了。他们必定就是作手的首批买主。他们一直前行，跟着买卖。所以无论在整个操作的哪个时期，他们都是一股有用的力量。我知道凯恩常会利用最能做事的营业员，既能瞒住他的炒作，同时也因为凯恩知道营业员们是拓展市场和传播消息的好手。他经常按照比行情高的股价，通过口头承诺，把认购权交给营业员，以便他们在能够获利落袋之前帮点儿小忙。他能使他们获得该获得的利益。想让这些行业内的人为我做事，我自己一点儿额外的事情都不必做，只要把一只股票搞得活蹦乱跳就好。营业员没有多少要求。不过，你也要明白，在交易所大厅里买进，是为了卖出赚钱。他们不会坚持等到有很大的利润，但一定要是那种很快就能兑现的利润。

我把一只股票搞活，以吸引股民们的眼球，其中的原因已然讲明。我买卖一只股票，营业员也会跟着交易。既然有这么多股票用于投机，就像我坚持的那样，用认购权把它锁死，就不会有太大的卖出压力。所以，买盘总要比卖盘强，股民们主要不是跟着作手走，而是跟着营业员走，他们会转为买家。我对这样的需求非常满意，可能会抛出股票。如果市场需求是正常的，需要的股票数量就会远远高于我在炒作一开始时被迫买进的数量，如果这样的话，我就会放空。这是技术层面的放空，也就是说，我卖出去的比我的持股还要多。这对我来说是非常安全的，因为我是根据认购权卖出的。当然了，到了股民们没有那么多需求了，股价就不再上涨，我就会停下来等待。

然后，如果这只股票不再上涨，大盘在某一天会因为疲软而回调，或者那些眼光好的营业员能看明白我的这只股票没有人买，他们就会放空这只股票，跟着他们的那些人也会放空。无论什么原因，我的股票价格开始下跌。我就得买进，支撑这只股票，就像一只股票得到自己的公司派欢迎时，应该有的那种支撑一样。而且，我还不用买进股票，就能够支撑住它，也就是说我不用增加持股数量，省得以后还要往出卖。要记住，我如此支撑股价并不会因此损伤财力。自然，我的所作所为实际上是在回补我之前用高价放空的股票。那个时候，我能够在股民们和交易人员的需求前提下，高价放空这些股票。你总该清楚地向人们表明，当这只股票下跌了的时候，总会有人买。如此，一般会制止业内人士莽撞地放空，也会让那些担惊受怕的股东暂缓抛出股票。当股票的走势越来越不好，你一般都会看到这样的卖出压力。一旦没有支撑，股票马上就出现这样的情况。我这样回补，也是我所说的稳定程序中的一个步骤。

市场变好时，我自然会一路前行卖出，可总也不会到阻止股票涨势的程度。我这全是按照稳定计划进行。诚然，在合理有序的股市上涨情形中，卖出的越多，越能鼓励那些保守的投机分子，他们可比鲁莽的营业员数量多得多，股价也迟早会变得疲软，如此情况下，我卖出的越多，对这只股票的支撑就越大。因为我一直在维护放空的部位，所以对自己没有危险，还能支撑股票。一般而言，当我觉得价格到了能赚到利润的时候就卖出。不过，我也常在无利可图的时候卖，因为要为自己的买进创造或者增加买进力量。这就是我说的没有任何风险的买进，我所做的不只是要拉抬股价，或者为客户卖出多少股票，也要为自己牟利。这是我不让客户为我提供操作资金的原因，我的收费取决于我的操作能否成功。

当然，我说的这些并不是我一直在用的手法，我既没有一种一成不变的僵硬系统，也不会按照这种系统去操作。我会因势而动，与时俱进，随时调整。

如果想把一只股票卖出去，就该尽力炒作到最高价后再卖。我重复这一点，一是因为这是最基本的原则，二是因为我非常清楚，人们都相信所有的卖压出现在头部。有的时候，一只股票会停停走走，这样的话，股价是不会上涨的，也就到了卖出的大好时机。你的卖出会让股价下跌，甚至跌到你无法想象的地步，不过你一般也能拉起股价。只要我炒作股票的在我的买单下回升，那我就会很安全，如果有必要，我还可以有充足的信心去勇敢地花自己的钱去买进股票，如同我买进其他类似情形的股票。这是最小阻力线，你记得我曾说过与这个相关的交易见解吗？最小阻力线被确定后，我会按该路线前进，并不是因为我在那个特殊的时刻炒作那只特定的股票，而是因为我自始至终都是那只股票的操作人。

我的买进如果不能拉动股价，我就会停止买进，然后再卖出，即便我恰巧没在炒作它，我也会如此行事。你该清楚，卖掉一只股票的主要手段，是要一路向下卖。在股价下跌时能够卖出那么多，简直让人吃惊。

我再说一遍，在炒作的时候，我从来没有忘掉自己是股票交易人。毕竟我炒作股票的时候，所遇到的问题与操作股票时是一样的。作手如果不能让股票按照自己的意愿波动，就要停止炒作。你在炒作的股票如果没有按照应该出现的情势发展，就该马上出脱，不要跟股市大盘讲道理，也不要想着赚回你的利润，赶快在还能够脱身并且还算廉价脱身的时候就跳出来，为时不晚。