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UNIT9

Chinese-American Relations: A History(Ⅱ)

The Cold War to the Present

The Cold War

After the war, a new war

of international tension, intrigue

and political posturing, called the Cold War,

forced the U.S. to scrap

any thoughts of the false comforts

of official isolation. It joined

the United Nations (UN) and other

international organizations, such as

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

the International Monetary Fund (IMF),

and the General Agreement on Tariff

and Trade (GATT). It was determined

to play a major, if not

dominant role, in post war

international affairs. The world

was the stage for intense rivalry

between the Communists, on one side,

and democratic Capitalists on the other.

It fostered close scrutiny

of each other, as well as

a brisk interchange of often fabricated

and distorted propaganda between

the polarized sides. It injected

the fear that if one side blinked,

a nuclear war would be triggered.

The world, seemingly, was always

on the verge of warfare.

This environment placed the United States

and China on opposite sides

once the Communists took power

in China in 1949. This constant

friction jeopardized chances for

meaningful political interaction and intercourse.

This atmosphere of distrust and fear

left little incentive for the

different sides to talk seriously.

By the end of the Second World War,

or during the last year or

two of the war, the world stage

was being set for the Cold War.

President Truman's attitude toward China hardened.

American policy was explicit that

only one China, Nationalist China

led by Chiang Kaishek, on the island

of Taiwan, was the official China.

The Americans made it abundantly clear,

that Mao Tsetung's Communist Regime,

on mainland China, would not occupy

China's permanent seat in the United Nations

Security Council.

The outbreak of war on

the Korean Peninsula brought about

an abrupt change of focus

in American foreign policy.

The new American strategy was

to militarily isolate or alienate

China in Asia. To accomplish this,

the United States established bases

in East Asia and mutual defense

treaties in East Asia. Treaties

were negotiated with Japan, the Philippines,

Australia, and New Zealand. American

President Eisenhower later expanded

these to include South Korea,

Pakistan, and Thailand. To cap off

this antiChina strategy, the US

strengthened ties with Taiwan or

Nationalist China, with which

the former had official diplomatic ties.

In the 1950s, American power and

credibility deteriorated somewhat

in the Cold War. Its own people,

who began to oppose McCarthyism

and the blunt anti-communist policies

of John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary

of State in the Eisenhower Administration,

helped to undermined national prestige.

In 1953, Josef Stalin,

the Soviet leader, died. These events

helped to bring about a shift

in direction in American foreign policy.

The United States began to

look more to Asian events as

major threats to America's national security.

The Iron Curtain was firmly established

in Europe, and NATO forces provided

secure protection on the western side

of the curtain. For the time being,

things looked fairly stable in Europe.

In the East, because of

the end of the Korean War and

the exodus of the French from

Indo-China, things were not

as stable. The American political

elite contended that the foremost

problem was the vacuum left

by the French withdrawal from Indo-China.

To officials in the United States,

this void must not be filled

by another communist regime.

The realization of objectives

of the domino theory (the essence

of which was, that if not checked,

countries in an given area

will all gradually fall to

communist rule) could not be

allowed to perpetuate.  The Chinese Revolution

had established a communist regime

in the most populous country

in the world, and the tensions

between North and South Korea

were not going to go

away overnight. Success of

the domino theory  looked more likely

in Asia than in Europe.

The United States felt that

it needed to concentrate its energies

and resources in Asia.

American policies, during the 1960s

and early 1970s, essentially were

to prevent communist takeovers in Asia,

in particular, particularly in South Vietnam

and Taiwan. American policy

was to contain communism where

it already existed, while simultaneously

coexisting peacefully with its cold war

communist rivals. Military expenditures

increased as defense budgets went

sky high with democratic and communist

bureaucracies building huge arsenals

or inventories of high velocity,

even supersonic destructive nuclear weapons,

in a very fragile polarized world.

Even China tested a thermal

nuclear weapon in the early 60s.